Amid the problems that have been rocking the country for several months now, the information about two thousands Kazakhs who have probably fallen victim to the Pegasus spy program developed by Israeli NSO Group seems like small potatoes. However, it only seems that way.

In our opinion, this “small potato”can have a shattering impact on the Kazakh authoritarian political system and the “super-presidential” vertical. Of course, in order for this to happen, a complete list of those whose phones have been “contaminated” with the spy program should be made public. Along with the names of the structures that have bought this program.

Unfortunately, at this point, the surnames of only eight affected Kazakhs have been reported. Note that three of them belong to the top of the country’s ruling elite – President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kossym-Jomart Tokayev, Prime Minister Askar Mamin and Akim of Almaty Bakytzhan Sagintayev.

Here is a quote from the article titled “Who’s Been Spying on Tokayev and Mamin? OCCPR Reveals the Pegasus Goals” published on KZ.media.

“The list mentions few reporters but does include the names of representatives of the country’s political sand business elite; among them, the rivals and the alleged supporters (of the First President of the RK Nursultan)”, - says the investigative report conducted by non-profit network of journalists Forbidden Storied and human rights advocates from Amnesty International”.

In our opinion, under the conditions of the Kazakh authoritarian political system, such tactic seems quite reasonable and logically sound since, at this moment, the main threat to the power holders lies not so much in the non-uniformed and scanty opposition (not to mention individual protestors) then in the elite clans (groups) even if their leaders do not express any evident political ambitions. Therefore, it is not surprising they have been spying on the latter, first and foremost.

As for civil activists and protest groups, they should not consider Pegasus a real threat. Due to that simple reason that, as of the beginning of the 2000s, the secret service has been widely employing the traditional methods of information gathering against these groups.

For instance, they control the movements of these people and their contacts by using the standard telecommunication equipment; listen in their conversations (made by phone and messenger services) by using a special equipment mandatorily installed in the offices of telecommunication companies; assemble hidden video cameras and bugging devices; conduct unofficial searches; organise hacker attacks and, finally, simply infiltrate suspicious structures.

Considering all this, using the Pegasus spy program against civil activists and protest groups (unregistered political parties) is clearly an overreach. Especially since the NSO Group products are by no means cheap.

Therefore, we do allow for the possibility that the craftsmen from the National Security Committee have bugged the digital devices of only those people who are capable of defending themselves against the other means of information gathering by the secret service or… are simply serving as the NSC agents.

This king of double control over the secret service agents is standard for the NSC and its historical predecessors – the NKVD-NKGD-KGB.

On the other hand, we do allow for the possibility that it is not only the state (the NSC) that has bought the Pegasus program. For, in Kazakhstan, it is impossible to keep silent about actions taken by the state structures against the elite clans, groups of influence and individual weighty figures. Sooner of later, the truth comes out – people will either let the secret our or sell the information.

For this reason, these sensitive operations are often conducted outside the agency as the case of Rakhat Aliyev and his OPG demonstrates. Therefore, it is quite possible that the Pegasus program was purchased by certain private structures. Granted, they did have the required letters provided by some state agency (not necessarily the NSC) as a cover.

There can be no doubt that the Kazakh state agencies will keep total silence or deny everything that can be denied. However, if the investigative reporters reveal the complete list of the people whose phones have been bugged and name the structures that have purchased the program, one will be able to tell, with a high degree of probability, who has organised this special op. And, by doing so, they will sow discord within the group of the people who are both governing Kazakhstan and abusing their authorities at the same time.

P.S. Incidentally, we will not be surprised if they find out that the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan did not sanction this operation. Moreover, we allow for the possibility that he himself and his third wife have fallen victim to the bugging and the watching. It would be quite logical a step on the part of those who have such capabilities (recall Rakhat Aliyev again). For the information about what the Elbasy is thinking and saying would serve as the best guarantee of political durability for certain esteemed leaders of the current regime.