In the second half of november press-secretary of the ministry of foreign affairs of Russia Maria Zakharova made a statement in which she expressed the concern with the increase in activity of the Islamic state organization (forbidden in Russia) in Northern Afghanistan and with the growing threat of terrorism in the regions of the country bordering Central Asia.
Unfortunately, despite the absence of confirmed information on the situation in the northern provinces of Afghanistan – information coming from over there reflect less a real state of affairs as they do the position of sides, responsible for its dissemination – there are reasons to believe that the worries of the Russian foreign policy institution are justified.
Not long ago, information was unearthed on the presence of sustainable channel of transfer of fighters of “Afghan IS” (the name refers to “Khorasan IS” established in 2015) through a region of Arfghandab of the Zabol province and further through the region of Mussa-Kala of the Hilmand province to province of Gor, and then to provinces of Herat, Badgis, Faryab and Jauzjan, neighboring Turkmenistan. Also there is a channel through regions of Achin and Shinvar of the Nangahar province and then through provinces of Kunar and Nuristan into province of Badashan neighboring Tajikistan.
Based on existing data (as of late 2016), in the regions of Navo and Gelan of the Ghazni province there is an operating staging post for transfer of fighters of this group through the region of Jakhuri into northern region of Afghanistan, created by Afghan IS. Appearance of “Afghan IS” is also noted by experts in the province of Balkh, Sari-Pul and Kunduz.
Of course it is not possible to verify this information, but despite it coming from persons, more or less, sympathizing with one of the military-political forces within Afghanistan, we shouldn’t doubt that it reflects (and as it seems with high degree of veracity) real facts.
The sad confirmation of galvanizing of Afghan Is was high-profile terror acts, reports of which came throughout 2017 (unfortunately this tendency of growth of terror acts, will most likely remain in december and there is no reason to expect that there will be any positives changes in this tendency at the end of the year).
What kind of aid does Afghanistan need
In recent months, starting approximately from fall of 2016, author of this article, as part of personal contact with Afghans has often received information about transfer of fighters from the ranks of citizens of Central Asian republics, by the military-transport aviation of US from Iraq and Syria into Pakistan and then via helicopters without identifying marks with stops in territories not controlled by Afghan security forces , into the north of Afghanistan. Interlocutors considered them to be supporters of ISIS.
Such information again raises the issue (often raised by Russian foreign policy institution) of the character of foreign involvement into Afghan situation.
Evidently, Afghanistan needs international aid. Without it Afghan government simply won’t be able to survive. As an illustration, we can bring up the fact that the project of Afghanistan’s budget for 2018 financial year, which was published in early September, oversees that around half of government budget (comprising less than $5.2 bil. dollars ) will be formed through financial aid of Kabul’s foreign partners. However, it is required that goals of the states giving military and economic support to Afghanistan, are clearly outlined, and their activity carries (as much as possible due to security concerns) as transparent a character as possible.
From Nov. 14 to 17 the 7th conference on regional economic cooperation with Afghanistan,w as held in Ashkhabad, with the goal of uniting the efforts of neighbor-countries on rectifying peaceful life in this troublesome country. Similar problems were at the center of attention at the recently held international conference Central Asia: one past and one future, cooperation for sustainable development and mutual thriving, held in Samarkand, where president of Uzbekistan Mirziyoev offered his vision of the path to normalization of the situation in Afghanistan.
However, despite international aid and aspiration to outline international program of action on regulating inner-Afghan conflict and socio-economic development of the country, situation in Afghanistan hasn’t changed for the better. Based on the data of American military, as of late 2016, government military controlled 258 regions, while oppositional armed formations controlled 33, and constant armed conflicts took place in 116.
At the same time, last year in Afghanistan around 10 thousand Afghan militarymen died, as well as 11 thousand civilians. In early Feb. 2017 management of SIGAR announced that, the number of victims among Afghan military men in 2016 has risen by 35% compared to 2015. Looks like this tendency will be preserved in the current year: Afghanistan remains the main sore spot of the region. Thus, an armed conflict in Afghanistan continues to have a negative influence on the state of affairs in other countries. And as the galvanizing of fighters, operating in the northern regions grows, this influence becomes more and more dangerous.
What are the risks to the countries of the region?
More often media reports about ranks of ISIS fighters being filled up by Afghan Turkmen and Uzbeks, living in the areas bordering Central Asian countries. How much can these sources be trusted is a separate issue. At least, the Turkmen official with whom author of this article was able to talk, only confirms the abovementioned information partially.
He agrees with the opinion of a slew of Russian experts, who say that part of organized criminal groups on the border with Turkmenistan, act on behalf of IS on a “franchise basis”. By his estimates, Turkmen security forces have a good grasp on the operating situation at the Afghan border, in the places of settlement of ethnic Turkmen. Interlocutor makes an emphasis on the criminal component at the Afghan-Turkmen border, which is a heavy one and still remains a headache for Ashkhabad.
Nonetheless, the more often stated information on the activity of IS fighters on the north of Afghanistan, shouldn’t be ignored. According to details, recently published by American analytical center Soufan Group, at least 4,2 thousand from Central Asian countries, fought on the side of IS in Syria and Iraq. This number is an approximation and it came out of the analysis of open sources of information. If you believe an accepted algorithm of calculation (1/3 fighters die, 1/3 of fighters won’t return to homeland), then at least 1,4 thousand citizens who gained combat skills, will return home to Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
Northern Afghanistan, where ethnic Uzbeks, Turkmen and tajiks live is a natural place of transfer from Syria and Iraq of those fighters from post-Soviet space, who will not risk coming back to their homecountry in the near future. An implied proof of this is a recent statement by the head of ministry of foreign affairs of Afghanistan Salahuddin Rabbani, according to which over 25% of terrorists plaguing his country are foreign citizens.
Russian, Central Asia and especially Kazakhstan see a threat in that, as they keep losing ground in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan will continue being a territory of reassignment for fighters of IS. This threat is bolstered by the understanding that Afghanistan is an important part of world shadow economy, and thus interests of not only specific governments, but also trans-governmental criminal syndicates are intertwined there.
This circumstance is aggravated by the weakness of central authority in Afghanistan: local adminsitrators rely on their personal armed formations, to provide their security, and who most of the time carry out their duties outside of any legal frameworks. Attempts to build a managerial chain of command in the country, face the inevitability of having to consider political and enforcement strength of various Afghan ethnic and religious leaders, attempting to agree on so-called representative quotas, especially when appointing governors, which seldom works.
IMTA: personalities and relations
Still under discussion is the issue of possibility of cooperation of outside interested parties with one Islamists against other Islamists. For example. For example forbidden in Russia (included in the federal list of organizations, deemed terrorist, by the decision of SC of RF from Feb. 14 2003) Islamic movement of talibs of Afghanistan (IMTA), on one hand is a competitor of IS in Afghanistan. One of the major contradictions between them is that supporters of Taliban follow Hanafi school, and the so-called ISIS fighters present themselves as Salafis.
However, on the other hand the information that comes in points toward the presence of time-to-time periodic interaction between armed formations, considered by outside observers to be part of Taliban, with combat cells of Afghan IS. Such instances were registered throughout last and current year during combat activities against governmental armed forces in the provinces of Kandahar, Hilmend, Zabol, Nangarhar and Kabul.
Experts point out that initially, Afghan ISIS consisted of Pashtuns originating in the Urukzai region at the border with Pakistan. Their central office was in the region of Achin in the Nangarhar region. However, none of the surveyed experts could answer the question of how this interaction between Afghan IS and Taliban is carried out after liquidation in 2016 of Hafiz Said Khan who was the head of IS in Afghanistan and of Abdul Hasib in the spring of this year.
Expert from Tajikistan, with whom I had a chance to chat, indicates that as IS is being pushed out from Syria and Iraq, the share of Arabs, Tajiks, Uighurs and Uzbeks in the ranks of Afghan IS, quickly increases. And as this tendency develops, contradictions between IS and IMTA in Afghanistan will only rise, since the main issue will be in the competition for source of financing, one of which in Afghanistan, traditionally is production of drugs, Struggle for control over production and channels of export of heroin inevitably leads to rise in the tension throughout the perimeter of Afghan border; thus the opinion of the expert from Tajikistan somehow overlaps with estimates of the aforementioned Turkmen official,
Thus, it turns out at least theoretically, that IMTA and IS are more enemies to each other, than long-term partners, and this allows to use one against the other one. And it must be mentioned that in recent years contacts with representatives of IMTA weren’t a secret to anyone; intermediaries in regulating of Afghan crisis, contacted with the Taliban in Qatar, China, Norway, Pakistan, Turkey, France, Japan and other geographic coordinates.
Despite the violence against Shiite population in Afghanistan, Iran also keeps in touch with some high-ranking field commanders of IMTA. Most likely, Tehran considers an advancement of IS in Afghanistan a real threat, which cannot be underestimated, and that should be countered by any means.
In the fall of last year Qatar has held talks between representatives of the Taliban movement and Afghanistani government. Their main subject was the process of peaceful regulation, but the sides weren’t able to agree on any points of the issue, which wasn’t the first time this happened. Apparently, the lack of results of these talks provided the basis for the decision of closing of the Taliban office in Qatar and its transfer to another country. In this backdrop, hysterical attempts to blame Russia in having contacts with this or that wing of IMTA, as well as with representatives of other key military-political formations in Afghanistan, look strange. But whatever the case, present authorities in Kabul do not cease their attempts at warning against cooperation with Taliban against other Islamists. In particular, advisor to the president of Afghanistan Hanif Atmar, during his visit to Moscow in March of this year announced, that IMTA and ISIS are essentially the same thing, they have the same toots, same interests and ideology.”
Authorities in Kabul are right in a way: at some point leader of IMTA was a hospitable host for the leader of Al-Qaeda. Why not continue the tradition of eastern hospitality in the present time? Especially since, despite ethnic differences and interpretations within Islam, both guests and hosts, overall agreed in the understanding of organization of the “future khalifat”.
However, when considering the military-political situation in Afghanistan it is it is necessary to consider the fact that it is still premature to speak of the presence of a clearly-defined structure of Afghan IS, as well as of the sustainability of the inner structure of IMTA in its present state. It must be said that Taliban, even during Omar’s times wasn’t a monolithic movement. And after his demise, inner competition essentially destroyed earlier-existing understandable structure of IMTA.
We remind that the Taliban movement was created in 1992 under direct participation from United intelligence bureau of the ministry of defense of Pakistan and was a unity of armed forces, varying in their size, formed on the religious and ethnic basis, primarily from Pashtun tribes. From 1996 until 2001, IMTA was in power in Afghanistan, and compromised itself as an authority showing a complete lack of ability to run the government.
Nonetheless, despite US’s military operation finishing Taliban’s rule, the movement remained strong and had a clear inner organization. Particularly supreme assembly of IMTA continued to be the leading body of the organization, which contained 20 of most respected members of the organization, and importantly, representatives of allied extremist groups. The leader of the Islamic party of Afghanistan (IPA, formed in 1976, is also included in the Federal list of organizations, considered terrorist by the supreme court of Russia) Hekmatyar, was also part of the supreme assembly of IMTA.
After coming of Karzai’s transitional government to power in 2001, Hekmatyar didn’t receive any position in it. He didn’t recognize. He didn’t recognize the new government as legitimate, announced is disagreement with American military presence in the country and his intentions to fight against them. He was able to unite forces of his organization with other opposition armed forces, get into alliance with IMTA and Al-Qaeda and agree with them on cooperative actions.
Leader of the IPA traditionally enjoyed the financial support of all-Muslim association of extremist groups “Muslim brothers”,as well as patronage of the united intelligence agency of the defense ministry of Pakistan. There are known instances of contact between administration of IPA with representatives of the corps of guardians of Islamic revolution of Iran. Supreme assembly of IMTA in full, met regularly, on average three times a year. It can’t be said that this institution was unanimous in their opinions, however, for a long time, the movement had a clear structure.
Field commanders, conducting operations in seven zones (Center, north, north-east, east, west, the great Paktia, the great Kandahar), in which Afghanistan was nominally divided, answered directly to IMTA. They were entitled to their right to independently plan and conduct military operations, as well as to form the makeup of the alternative government institutions on sight. In every one of the 34 provinces provincial councils were created, which were essentially shadow regional governments, which answered to supreme assembly of IMTA. Before the death of Mullah Mohammad Omar in Afghanistan, aside from the governor, appointed by the president, there also was informal governor appointed by the leader of Taliban, and as a rule having large authority.
Moreover, the supreme assembly has created six commitees (military, economic, material-technical, propaganda and information, political issues and religious issues one) which solved all of the ongoing goals of IMTA.
Relative unity of IMTA has ended with the death of Mullah Omar in April of 2013. For two years Taliban was unable to appoint a new leader. Omar’s deputy Akhtar Muhammad Mansur has become his successor for some time from July of 2015. Appointment of Mansur has fractured IMTA – Mullah Mohammad Rasul has become his adversary. Also the new leader of Taliban was fighting with the influential field commander Abdul Kayum Zakir. In the late 2015, during the meeting of two field commanders, called in to seize existing struggles a gun fight has happened in Pakistan, during which Akhtar Muhammad has Mansur was seriously injured. In May of 2016 he was liquidated as a result of the attack of American unmanned aircraft.
Khabatulla Akhund, whose appointment wasn’t recognized by a slew of influential field commanders, has become the new IMTa head. Despite the fact that Hakkani and Omar’s son mavlavi Yakub were chosen as deputies of the new leader, it can’t be said that the new Taliban leader expresses interests of all armed formations, that consider themselves to be part of IMTA. This means that some of them won’t forego one of the fundamental demands of removing of foreign military from the territory of Afghanistan, as a required condition for start of negotiations. Moreover, they will continue insisting on changing of the constitution, recognizing IMT as a legal part of Afghan political system, excluding of heads of the movement from the black list of UN, emancipation of their supporters from prisons, opening in Afgahnistan of legal offices of the movement.
At the same time, today one of the fighter divisions of IMTA headed by Ibrohimi Sadrom conducts active operations in the south-west of Afghanistan. Another division – under the administration of mullah Mohammad Rasul in the provinces of Hilmend, Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabol. In the east and central provinces network of Sirodjiddin Hakkani continues its activity, he is a military deputy of Khaibatula Akhund, is considered an independent player and is directly related to United intelligence agency of the ministry od defense of Pakistan.
Alternatives and hopes for the future
Today it is hard to tell through who exactly the talks with IMTA should be conducted, which creates confusion, and reason to divide Taliban into “good” and “bad” talibs, to try and determine which faction is the main one. Nonetheless, the beginning of a peaceful process with participation from government of Afghanistan and representatives of IMTA, regardless of which faction negotiators will represent, most likely will be the only alternative to the continuing war and the only means to end it. At least the IPA’s leader Gulbeddin Hekmatyar’s denial of armed struggle with the government gives certain hopes, however, it doesn’t solve the main problem for the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia.
At the same time for central Asia and Kazakhstan, the main threat continues to come not from the Taliban movement itself but from the adjoining to it or to Afghan IS terrorist organizations, such as Tabligi Jamaat, Salafiya, Hizbut ut-Tahrir, Islamic movement of Turkestan, etc. Among them are many natives from central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and Russia. They constantly migrate from one gang to another, and thus it isn’t always possible to identify their allegiance. However, they usually don’t stay unaffiliated for long.
At the VI Moscow conference on international security (it was held on Apr. 26-27, 2017, the author was its participant) data was presented, according to which new training centers for preparing terrorists from Central Asia and post-Soviet countries are popping up in the provinces of Fryab, Sary-Pul, Samangan, Tahor, Kunduz, Badakhshan. Behind the actions of Islamic terrorists are usually, whole allianes, consisting of intelligence services, private and investigative companies, as well as political activists. Thus, efforts to initiate peaceful talks between Afghans are met with severe resisting. Recent terrorist attack, carried out by a bomber near a meeting place of IPA and the government proved this.
Thus, prospect of a peaceful regulation of Afghan conflict, for now look quite distant and uncertain. And this means that we need to expect further escalation of armed resistance in the north of Afghanistan, and thus increase in the number of islamic fighters entering central Asian countries, including those controlled from international islamist centers.
These days, more often we hear warnings that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will become the territory that might suffer the most from the actions of terrorist structures. Why these countries in particular face the highest terrorist danger today? Most likely due to a presence of considerable energy resources. It’s hard to understand, who really controls these centers, coordinating and supporting terrorist activity – specific governments or interested groups within trans-national corporations and national intelligence services of given countries. And in this backdrop, a desire to strengthen the regime of guarding of the border with Afghanistan seems logical. This is despite the fact that, even on that issue they still can’t arrange needed level of inter-governmental cooperation between post-Soviet space partners. In this environment, despite all the uncertainty of present situation, we can only state that: for a while tranquility is but a lovely dream.
