The main thing about the upcoming power transit in Kazakhstan is the consensus among the elite, believes Russian political science expert Andrey Grozin. If the elites will be able to reach an agreement without a fight, there is a chance for reforms in Kazakhstan under the new leadership.

We are continuing the series of the interviews on the upcoming power transit in Kazakhstan. We have already talked to Andrey Chebotarev (Group of Successor Will Come to Power), Tolganay Umbetaliyeva (Kazakhs Won’t Tolerate a Successor from the Family). Today, we will discuss this subject with the Head of the Central Asia and Kazakhstan Department of the Institute of CIS Countries Andrey Grozin.

— Andrey Valentinovich, expert.kz has published a series of the interviews on the possible start of a new political season in Kazakhstan that has to do with the upcoming 2020 Presidential elections. These interviews voice different opinions. For example, Sergey Duvanov believes that the transit will happen unexpectedly, and that the successor does not and cannot exist. At the same time, Andrey Chebotarev suggests that the successor does exist, however, it is not one person but a whole group of people. What do you think of the upcoming transit?

— One opinion does not contradict the other. I agree with Duvanov that the current President will exit the power only in the event of his death and, while he is alive, the appearance of a successor is unlikely. Look at what is happening in the neighboring Kyrgyzstan. This is a clear example of how successors betray the people who put them on their feet. The person who becomes the President, due to the subjective and objective reasons, is keen on shaking off the past. And here I agree with Tolganay Umbetaliyeva that a lot depends on how much the successor will be interested in making real changes and not imitating them, if he will need to assert himself via rejecting the practices of the person who turned him into the new leader of the country.

As to the possible successors, in my opinion, Chebotarev’s scenario is the closest one to reality – several forces will enter the fight becoming a group successor but, eventually, only one contender will be left. This process will take time – I mean selecting the group forces, selecting and eliminating different successors until there is only one left.

I will repeat, however, that this process will start only after the First President exits the power. At this point, we can only make guesses that likely turn out to be false since the actual personas that will compose the group successor will influence the selection process. Therefore, different scenarios are possible.

Going baсk to the beginning of the talk, I will repeat that no successor will appear while Nazarbayev is still in power. In this respect, I share Duvanov’s position. But I do not agree with him on the amount of time he allots for Nazarbayev’s rule. Another 10-15 years is too much! Of course, the medicine performs miracles, but this is above and beyond. I think it can be no more than seven years.

We are discussing Trump’s or Putin’s political prospects from the age standpoint, and Nazarbayev is 77! No matter which way you slice it, only few active political leaders are long-livers. Deng Xiaoping comes to mind; however, he had not been in power during his last years. When he assumed the position of the informal leader, China had formed an unofficial principle of building the highest echelon of power on the basis of the consensus among different elite groups. But China is a unique political model of the inter-elite relationships. And Xi Jinping is moving away from it by changing the system in which the alteration of the political power preserved the consensus among the elite groups.

—On the other hand, there exists an opinion that the strengthening of the Kazakhstan Security Council is the scenario of Nazarbayev’s gradual retreat from the power.  

—I will repeat, while the President is alive, the successor is not to appear. And the statements that Nazarbayev is to retire and become the Head of the Security Council whose authorities have been significantly extended may rather be a fail-safe option, and one of the several ones at that.

In other words, the Presidential Administration and Nazarbayev’s closest circle have created several scenarios of the transit. And each VIP-person sees one of these scenarios as preferential for themselves. One of the groups I presume have lobbied the Security Council idea. Just in case. It is the way many other things in Kazakhstan and the neighboring countries are handled as well.

Why, for example, has Rahmon decreased the age requirement for the Presidential candidate? Exactly, it has been done specifically for the Tajikistan leader’s son. Rahmon, however, is not planning to go anywhere and his health is much better than that of his colleagues in the region. He has simply created a fail-safe option.

Or why does Berdymukhamedov need to promote his son along the Parliamentary line, send him to the unofficial meetings with the colleagues in the region thus raising his formal and informal status? Again, just in case. It is all done to cushion an unexpected blow. The Kazakhstan maneuvers are of the same nature. 

— Thus, so far, you do not see the power transit preparations in Kazakhstan?

—You see, the people on the top are living under the constant stress and are waiting for the transit. The elite has been waiting for the past seven or eight years – what if we wake up in the morning and learn that, during the night, the power system has been changed? It is for this reason that the remolding of the media including the resources that are loyal to the political regime but belong to the “wrong players”, and the events that are happening in the banking sphere and are tied to the new wave of the privatization are not some extraordinary occurrences, not the examples of the stepping up of the elite but the constant fight for the resources – the financial, the media, the political ones so that, when the H-hour strikes, the group’s positions will be stronger than those of the competing group.

The elite is constantly waiting for the transit and preparing for it is their everyday life. Therefore, the expert and the media communities in the country, Central Asia, and in Russia approach any events in Kazakhstan from exactly this perspective. Partly, it is correct. Frankly speaking, however, waiting for the changes is tiresome. Searching for the signs of the possible changes in the Government or of the banks changing the owners is interesting but also too familiar by now.

Apart from that, we do not have clear indicators for understanding how the events are to unfold when the H-hour strikes. I presume the influential groups have several power transit scenarios. As to what is going on in Nursultan Nazarbayev’s head, this is known to nobody but many people including myself think that he will not retire to the very end in order to avoid the nonsense that is happening with Atambayev. Therefore, the power transit in Kazakhstan will be closer in style to the Uzbek version.

—Talganay Umbetaliyeva believes that the family scenario of the transit will cause a destabilization – the Kazakhs will not tolerate it if a member of the Nazarbayev family comes to power. Do you think this is possible?

— I respect her point of view but, unfortunately, the practices of Kazakhstan and the other CIS countries show that the civic society or the people’s opinion is the least important thing in the process of the power transit. I do not think that there will be a massive and impactful protest movement if Samat Abish or Dariga Nuesultanovna will be nominated as the Presidential candidates. Who will formulate the idea of the impermissibility of the family-style power transit? The patriots, the intelligentsia? On the contrary, they will be first to run up to the new leader to tell him how great he is and what a wonderful thing the continuity of power is.

The officials? They might, but only in the case if they feel left out. If one of the groups does not agree with the family scenario, then, it will try to call the people to the streets by using certain parts of the population. Just the way it was done in 1986. However, the success depends on the level of the power, the resources, and the support of the other elite groups. A single protest on the part of say a Western Kazakhstan native popular among the intelligentsia is unlikely to “inspire” the whole country.

Apart from that, I believe the family style power transit will be supported by the majority of the elite since this family member will promise to preserve the system.

— Why is it so important?

—The value of the stability dominates the mass consciousness no matter what anyone says about the necessity of the changes. The absolute majority both in Russia and in Kazakhstan does not want them. Yes, there is the vexation of spirit in our countries, they say that everything has been cemented, that it is like Brezhnev’s times and so on. But then, different mechanisms are activated – look at what is going on at the neighbors’, remember the “mighty” 90s. And this mantra has a soothing effect, especially on the older generation. The young people do not remember the 90s, for them, it is history, the movie “Zhmurki” (“Blindman’s Buff”) in which Mikhalkov performs the role of a brock in a red jacket. And for those who had lived during that time, stability is a very important value.

Apart from that, the people in our counties know very well that all the changes happen exclusively at the expense of the people. Yes, the people distrust the authorities in any post-Soviet country but display a rather passive attitude – anything goes as long as there is no war, as long as things do not get worse compared to what they are now. And this people’s wish allows the elites to count on the idea that any scenario that is acceptable for them will not cause an active counter-response.

The civic society of Kazakhstan that is said to be active on the social media is still at the forming stage. One thing is to leave a like or to repost a progressive news. But to actually lift your bottom off the coach and go change something is a completely different matter. Therefore, they may complain for a while and then take their feet off the gas.

We may expect some small spontaneous rebellions in the style of the “land protests” (a series of protests in Kazakhstan against giving the right for long-term rent of the farmlands to foreigners – Kazakhstan 2.0). However, from the point of view of an active political process, I can never call them a mass resistance. How many people participated in the meetings out of the entire country’s population? About 5 thousand people according to the official data. OK, let it be 10 thousand… For the country with an 18-million population, this number is miniscule. Therefore, this scale of the political activity of the population cannot influence the elite’s choice of the new president.

And why would the people not tolerate someone from Nazarbayev’s clan? Perhaps only Dariga Nursultanovna because the Kazakh society is still patriarchal and a woman in power is unlikely to appear at the current level of the political development. Apart from that, Nazarbayev’s daughter may be irritating to the elite since she has a certain way of behaving vis-à-vis the other representatives of the elite, and this style of behavior as well as her views are well-known.

But what if it is the nephew? Or the well-prepared grandson? For example, if they teach Nurali how to talk, walk, and present himself in a correct way, then why not? Who would speak against it except for the part of the elite that is coveting the second President’s chair? However, again, such people will either be bought or suppressed. Look at the authorities’ actions against the people arrested on the accusation of supporting the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan? The authorities were not deterred by the presence of European human rights activists in Kazakhstan at the time; perhaps they do not really care what the West thinks about them.

Thus, the process of the elite consolidation around a contender for the throne from Nazarbayev’s family or his nearest circle has least regard for the civic moods. The majority of the society will accept the person around whom the political elites of the country will unite. Those who will oppose will be suppressed – for Kazakhstan, it is not a problem. The main thing is - will they have enough prisons for this emergency.

— Is there a possibility for the Gorbachev style perestroika or for at least Mirziyoyev’s type of reforms after the power transit? Or will the successor have to preserve the existing rules of the game?

— The Gorbachev style perestroika is non-feasible, but one can hope for the Mirziyoyev scenario. The President Number Two, regardless of his desires, will be forced to position himself as a person who is doing something new.

— But what about the stability of the course?

— Yes, on one hand, he will talk about the stability and preserving Nazarbayev’s course. On the other hand, however, in order to gain respect from the elite and then the society, he will have to position himself as an independent figure that is eliminating the most backwards, odious things as it was after the deaths of Niyazov or Karimov. In other words, the style of the state management will certainly change.

Any next president, even if he turns out to be a former Komsomol member, “red director” (a Soviet type manager), First Secretary, will be of a different generation than Nursultan Nazarbayev. His generation is sliding away. The new President will build a mausoleum to honor of the First President. This mausoleum is will be visited, as in Tashkent or Baku, by delegations from other countries as part of the obligatory part of the tourist program. They will write a chapter in the school textbooks, name squares, avenues, and streets after him. However, the memory of him will gradually fade. And many things will change in politics.

Uzbekistan was able to do without revisioning the historic role of President Karimov. Turkmenistan, where there is almost nothing left of Niyazov’s legacy, his role in the newest history is also not being disavowed. Kazakhstan is likely to follow the same path, but only if the elites will be able to reach an agreement and will not end up fighting for the resources, the legacy, the concrete decisions of the concrete people. Then, the political system will move towards the liberalization - not because the new leader turns out to be a liberal but because such is the trend of today.

— Liberalization is the trend?

— Yes. The future president will replace the person who has ruled the country for more than 20 years, therefore, whether he likes it or not, he will have to show openness and the aptitude for reforms. These objective factors will lead to some unclenching of the iron fist, like it happened in Uzbekistan. And then, the political system will adapt to the new team. Someone will rise in the process, someone will maintain the status quo, someone will plummet to the bottom. It is a natural process of the inter-tribal fight that has existed and will exist among the elites.

— Should we expect repressions against the competitors?

— I do not think serious conflicts are feasible. Yes, someone may go to prison as it is happening in Uzbekistan, someone will be intact, someone will be sent as an honorary retiree to the Senate the way Inoyatov was, someone will be appointed the presidential advisor and be forgotten forever. However, we must understand that there are differences between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

— What are they?

— The Kazakhstan economy, for example, is more liberalized. Yes, it too is divided between the “best people of the kingdom”, the financial-industrial groups. But it is more effective than the Uzbekistan economy.

The latter possessed the following features – the monopoly of the state, the state capitalism, the backwardness, and orientation towards autocracy. And Mirziyoyev is reforming it. As for different instances of the political liberalization, they are just the accompanying elements. The essence of today’s Uzbekistan reform is to liberalize and rebuild the economic model.

Economically speaking, things are not as bad in Kazakhstan as they are in Uzbekistan despite the banking crisis, the distressed assets, the ineffectiveness of certain sectors. The elite, the budget, the country have more money. Therefore, there is no necessity to cardinally change the economy. And, perhaps for this very reason, the Second President of Kazakhstan will follow the route of big changes in the political system, the route of the reforms, of the political system modernization.

Of course, this line of reasoning is rather hypothetical. It is just that, sometimes, one wants to hope that, since the economy is in a more or less decent shape, the Second President will perhaps desire to change something in the politics. It is the human nature, to hope.

— What may destabilize the situation in Kazakhstan during the power transit?

— If the elites will not be able to reach an agreement and will end up fighting for the power. There can also be the external factors. By the way, both things may develop concurrently, and one may cause the other. The contenders for the throne are likely to run to different world capitals to tell stories on how their competitors are the bad and they themselves are the good guys.

The Uzbekistan elite was able to complete the process in a week. But one must understand that their players’ bench was much shorter than that in Kazakhstan where there are 10 to 15 people who have the resources, the influence, the good graces, and ties in the West, East, and North. Therefore, they will not be able to complete it in such a short period of time. Besides, it is harder to reach consensus among so many people. However, if they will be able to do so, then the external forces will subside since there will not be any threats to their interests. Therefore, the consensus among the elite serves everyone.

— Thank you for the interview.