Breaking into the Western markets is China’s strategic task that is being implemented via the One Belt One Road global concept. The strategic task of the Central Asian countries is to get on the train that travels that road. This is how the situation is perceived by Andrey Grozin, the Head of the Central Asia and Kazakhstan Department of the Institute of CIS Countries.

In the second part of the interview to the Kazakhstan 2.0 (kz.expert) portal, Andrey Grozin is talking about the Chinese influence on the Central Asian countries and the interests of the other players of this region.

Read the first part of the interview here- Why does China need Central Asia.

On the Safety of the Region

– Andrey Valentinovich, you have already mentioned that Central Asia is important to China from the national security standpoint. But what threats is the country facing?

– Obviously, the Afghanistan instability is not to go away in the near future. One can hold a number of conferences promoting peace in this country but… Here is an example. On the eve of the Tashkent conference (the March 27 international conference on Afghanistan called “Peace Process, Cooperation in the Sphere of Security and Regional Interaction” – Kazakhstan 2.0), the Uzbekenergo company announced the start of yet another electric power line construction in the North Afghanistan. Two days later, we learn that some unknown armed people (later identified by the official authorities as members of the Taliban) blew up the line thus interrupting the power delivery from Tajikistan to Kabul. This is a clear demonstration of how hard it is to try and rehabilitate the chronically warring, unstable country. And, next to it, we have Syria, Iraq, and it is still unclear how the Iran-US relationships are going to develop. Therefore, the instability in this part of the planet remains and, from the national security standpoint, the situation in Xinjiang will remain China’s priority hence the importance of the Central Asian foreground.

On the other hand, China today is not really worried about this area from the standpoint of transferring terrorism. All the Uighur communities that existed in Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan – have been put under strict control or seized to exist as organized units. This happened, on one hand, via the actions of the local authorities and security service agencies, on the other hand, due to the fact that China was stimulating these attempts, actions, intentions pointing them to the desired direction and, as far as I can see, was quite vigorous in this undertaking.

There is, however, another issue. If Central Asia becomes one of the main routes of the future OBOR transportation corridors, it is necessary that everything is secure around this infrastructure. The EPLs must not be blown up, the oil pipelines must not be unlawfully stubbed in, the Chinese rail carriers must not be robbed. Therefore, China will have to keep the necessary level of stability in the region which will enable the country to preserve the profitability of the transport operations via the new rail routes.

– How will China achieve it?

– I believe China will have to abandon the constantly promoted policy of the non-interference in the domestic matters of the other political systems. Strictly speaking, we can already see that in the Chinese authorities’ desire to review the previous international and domestic policies. And we are not only talking about lifting the restrictions of President Xi’s term limit. There are also issues connected to the possibility of attracting private military companies to protect certain businesses on certain territories or to creating military bases outside of China’s borders – something that has never been done before.  

Deng Xiaoping would turn over in his grave if he knew that China would build a navy base in Africa. As for private military companies, in China, they are growing faster than anywhere in the world. So, the force projection will obviously be strengthening via these institutions which will demand changing China’s traditional approach to the international policies including the relationships with the neighbors. The non-interference which has been China’s trademark for a long time will be at odds with the strengthening of the Chinese economic presence. This is what is expected, and the Central Asian countries are better start preparing for it now.

– In that vein, how do you assess the Astana summit of the Central Asian leaders?

– For some reason, everyone is discussing a possible integration of these countries, many said the summit was a potshot at the Kremlin. I do not think it was against the Kremlin or not just the Kremlin.

Already a year ago, my Chinese colleagues kept asking about a possibility of the political integration of the Central Asian countries and whether such attempts could be successful. I was surprised and answered quite frankly that I was not sure how topical this subject was since the political integration in Central Asia is impossible in the nearest future. This conversation happened immediately after the death of Islam Kerimov when it was not yet clear how the Uzbekistan policy would change. The Chinese, however, were already concerned, were following the events trying to assess the completely non-obvious perspectives.

– Is China worried about the hypothetical political integration of the Central Asian countries?

– I believe China’s approach to the hypothetical Central Asian integration, even in the light form, is twofold. On one hand, it is good because, as far as the OBOR is concerned, it is more convenient if the borders between the states are rather transparent, if there is one tariff, regime, common rules. It would be advantageous to China from the technological and financial standpoint. On the other hand, however, China prefers bilateral talks when its national interests are involved. And China does not want any “common opinions” to appear. It much prefers to separately force into submission the Kazakhs, the Tajiks, the Kyrgyz, even the Russians than to deal with their consolidated front.

On the Chinese “Soft Power”

– Apart from the economic influence, there is also the so called “soft power” of China. How do you assess it in relations to the Central Asian countries?

– The decision to use the “soft power” via creating the Confucian institutes, Chinese language classes, forming a positive image of China through cinema, music, opera that the country has been implementing for the past six years was made during Hu Jintao’s reign. It has been neither good nor bad. I believe there is a serious typological difference in understanding of the “soft power” in China and in the West, first of all, in the US.

The Chinese do not consider the soft power as a transforming force. Using it, they do not attempt to change other social and political systems. They use it to, primarily, create a positive image of China via the cultural and informational resources. For example, I was in Beijing last November, and the CCTV-Russkiy channel had not been operating yet. But, when I was in Shanghai this January, the TV-channel has already been actively collecting its audience. It was all done quite professionally – they hired Russian journalists, shot a number of films on the great Chinese philosophy, Chinese nature. I, for instance, watched a documentary on Xinjiang, on how life is good there and only going to get better.

In my opinion, it is a clear example of the difference in understanding of the “soft power” concept between China and the West.

Today, the circulation of some papers published under the direct Chinese sponsorship is quite high. The papers are made professionally, for an average citizen, talk about the Chinese economy, cuisine, medicine, and can be obtained for free.

So, it is not just the economic dependency. In general, the Chinese influence in the region is rising.

On the Kazakh Dream

– In one of your recent interviews, you said that “Kazakhstan is actively building the partnership with Russia in the EEU framework and is actively trying to become a part of the OBOR initiative with the perspective to either become a uniting point for these two projects or a disjoining point for them”. What did you mean by the “disjoining point”?

– I meant the possibility of the so called external impulse. Because Kazakhstan itself cannot be interested in becoming a conflict generating zone.

Let us imagine a hypothetical situation. The OBOR initiative is starting to develop fast. Khorgos is growing, they are building other border-crossing points, new ETLs, the Caspian ports are growing while any participation in the Northern neighbor’s economy is shrinking. What will it cause? The active resistance on the part of the Northern neighbor.

Or let us imagine this fantastical situation. Kazakhstan suddenly decides that the further development of the economic cooperation with China will create the unacceptable threats for the national security. So, the Chinese integration would be stopped, and the outflow of the Chinese investments would be compensated via the EEU, the domestic consumption, or some other way. What will it cause? The resistance on the part of the Chinese.

I believe the Kazakhstan elite would like to organically participate in both projects. Because, this way, Kazakhstan becomes the distributor of the transport, energy, project, and financial flows. It would be a very advantageous position since we are talking about a possibility to use the country’s transit potential to a maximum and, at the same time, to increase its own political and international power, to receive the resources. However, this positive scenario can only be realized if there will be no conflicts, if the world, after the geopolitical turmoil that is happening now, will agree on the peaceful co-existence. In other words, if everyone will agree to live peacefully and cooperate. Then, we will be able to talk about the realization of the Kazakh dream. In reality, however, it is hardly feasible since, with all due respect, Kazakhstan is not a player on the international political arena.

Kazakhstan has no say in how well or how badly the Russian and the Chinese geopolitical projects could work together. Kazakhstan is not a subject but, rather, an object of this play. Not one single Kazakhstan expert will agree with me, but any sensible person will say I am right on the money.

Yes, Kazakhstan has indeed achieved a number of successes in building its economic model (it has its imbalances, there are well-known problems in the banking sector, but it is all good from the standpoint of attracting foreign investments and supplying the Kazakhstan resources to the international markets). This, however, does not make Kazakhstan an independent player on the world political arena. Kazakhstan can only be an outside observer of the conflict between Moscow and the uniting West. It can reach its own conclusions but cannot influence the outcome.

What Kazakhstan is capable of doing is to try and solve the problems of the lower level such as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine where it can make some suggestions without much hope that someone actually take them or present a venue for a dialogue. But presenting a venue does not mean playing an active role in working out the ways to resolve the conflict.

Therefore, if the Russian and Chinese projects will succeed, if the Chinese and post-Soviet economies will break into the attractive Western markets, then fortune will smile upon Kazakhstan.

– Do you mean the EU market?

– Yes. Despite its internal problems, the EU remains the most attractive economic partner in the world. And if, for China, breaking into the Western markets is a strategic task, then, for everyone else, the strategic task is to jump on that Chinese train.

Do you remember how, already in 2006 or 2007, Putin said that it was necessary to follow the Chinese wind? That is what everybody is doing now. But the “Chinese wind” blows only in the direction beneficial to China, all the decisions in Beijing are made to China’s advantage. Yes, being a large state, China takes into consideration the problems of its neighbors and tries to bear them in mind when making decisions, but it will never do anything to its own detriment.

By the way, today, Russia, acting as a battering ram, is breaking up the established system of the world domination which is, obviously, in China’s interests. I am far from saying that there is some kind of conspiracy, some cunning plan worked out by China and Kremlin together. However, it seems that the escalation of the conflict between the collective West and Russia is beneficial to China since it has now got a peaceful break, the time that is working to its advantage.

To be continued.