The October 15 Kyrgyzstan presidential elections ended with the victory of Sooronbay Zheenbekov, the pro-government candidate. Two weeks have already passed since then, however, Almazbek Atambayev is continuing to celebrate his success that has been achieved, among other things, by the masterfully provoked diplomatic scandal with neighboring Kazakhstan. This rather effective politically engineered step has largely determined Sooronbay Zheenbekov’s victory.

The observers’ attention is still drawn to the Kazakh-Kyrgyz conflict that affects the matters of the customs administration. They also do not forget about the continuing political trolling performed by the current president of Kyrgyzstan. Nursultan Nazarbayev and the political management of Kazakhstan have been the intended “victims” of this trolling. Now, the deputies of the Russian Parliament, Vice-Speaker Igor Lebedev (a son of the LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky) and Yaroslav Nilov have joined them.

On October 23, the Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Interior announced the denunciation of the 2016 economic cooperation and integration agreement between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. On October 27, at the ceremony devoted to handing the credential letters by ambassadors of different countries, Almazbek Atambayev talked about the necessity of building the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway (with the access to Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean through Turkmenistan and Iran) in an urgent manner. Thus, even after the presidential campaign has ended, the political tensions between the countries not only continue to exist but now they have all the chances to be transformed into long-term negative factors affecting the future perspectives of the EEU.

In all likelihood, the current bilateral conflict will be pacified (but not forgotten) after the new president of Kyrgyzstan assumes his power on December 1, 2017. The thing is that Kazakhstan is a major importer of the Kyrgyzstan goods (in 2016, the Kazakhstan import of the Kyrgyzstan goods amounted to $274 mln).

Besides, one must not forget that 125 thousand labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan are officially registered in Kazakhstan. Therefore, the Kyrgyzstan economy cannot exist in the conditions of a long-term conflict with Kazakhstan. Exporting gold to Switzerland (amounting to about $500 mln) and transferring money from Russia by the labor migrants are clearly not enough.

There is hope (that may not, however, be realized) that the EEU Customs Code ratification by all the five members will ensure that no such conflict will happen in the future. At least, the new Customs Code will put into force Article 32 of the EEU agreement that affects the matters of transporting goods of the third countries including the so called “grey import” from China that is being actively practiced by both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, it looks like the ratification of the new Code will be deliberately prolonged by both Kyrgyzstan and Armenia.

Note that the Kazakh-Kyrgyz conflict has diverted attention from the events that are no less important for the region and the territories beyond it, for example, the recent official visit of Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to Turkey that took place on October 25-27.

The Uzbek president last visited Ankara 18 years ago. The relationship between the two countries, especially for the past 12 years, can be called neither friendly nor partner-like. In 1991, Ankara was the first one to officially acknowledge the independence of the Turkic states in the post-Soviet space. Later, however, Tukey became an asylum for many oppositionists of Islam Kerimov’s regime including the famous Muhammad Salikh.

Apart from that, Uzbekistan had accused the Turkish Islamists of the direct involvement in preparing Islam Karimov’s assassination in 1999 in Tashkent. After that, Uzbekistan, first out of all the Central Asian countries, closed the Turkish schools. Then, it unilaterally abandoned the visa free regime that existed for the citizens of both countries. In its turn, Turkey voiced severe criticism against Uzbekistan after the 2005 Andizhan events and, in 2011, it officially added Uzbekistan to the list of the five unfriendly countries.

When Shavkat Mirziyoyev had assumed his power, the situation started to change rapidly despite the fact that Muhammad Salikh still continues to live in Turkey. (During all these years, his influence on the domestic political processes in Uzbekistan has been nothing but a figment of the interested parties’ and political romanticists’ imagination. Today, he poses no serious threat to the current president of Uzbekistan).

It is important to note that it is much easier for the new president to achieve positive results in the sphere of foreign policy than to carry out the promised domestic reforms whose success will be largely determined by the president’s ability to attract foreign investments under the advantageous for the Uzbek economy conditions. The results of Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s official visit to Turkey confirm the idea that he is consistent in his strife for implementing the line of the “reasonable openness” and normalizing the relationships with the neighbors and the culturally related countries.

Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s first meeting with Recep Erdogan took place in Samarkand last year when the Turkish president visited Islam Karimov’s grave. After that, the two leaders met at the summits in Beijing, Astana, and New York.

For Turkey and its leader, establishing the constructive relationship with the new Uzbek authorities allows to restore and widen Turkey’s own presence in the crucial, from the geopolitical point of view, Central Asian state.

The recent visits of Shavkat Mirziyoyev to Moscow and Beijing during which they signed the intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements amounting to $15.8 bln and $23 bln, respectively speak for themselves. Against the background of these figures, the “weight” of the Ankara agreements is much more modest, about $3.5 bln. However, the significance of this visit must not be measured in the absolute numbers only.

Indeed, the goods turnover between the two countries, according to the results on 2016, does not reach $1.5 bln, however, it is still comparable to the Turkish-Kazakh goods turnover. At that, for the first nine months of 2017, it grew by 29%. Given this dynamic, the plans of Ankara and Tashkent to increase the volume of the goods turnover to $10 bln in the coming years seem quite feasible.

Turkey is interested in returning to the biggest market in the region (Uzbekistan’s population is comparable to that of Kazakhstan and the three Central Asian states taken together). At that, the bilateral economic cooperation will not be limited to the mutual trade only. It will try to encompass the banking and financial systems, transportation, agriculture, mining industry, healthcare, aviation, tourism, and science.

Uzbekistan attracts Turkey not only as a promising market but also as the state that occupies the seventh place in the world in regard to its natural gas reserves, the fourth place in regard to its uranium reserves, the sixth place in regard to its cotton-production industry. At that, these resources are owned by the state which gives Uzbekistan an advantage compared to, say, Kazakhstan where the resource ownership is a highly unpopular subject. Note that the Turks have probably learned from their previous mistakes when, during the early years of independence of the post-Soviet Central Asian countries, they tried to act as if they owned everything. Obviously, today, no one will tolerate such attitude. The Turkish businessmen will be the desirable guests in Uzbekistan, but guests nonetheless.

At the same time, the Turkish entrepreneurship has a vast experience. For example, in Turkmenistan (with whom the goods turnover exceeds $6 bln a year) they invest in cotton consumption, textile industry, construction, food industry. In Uzbekistan, it will be easier to adapt these practices than to start from nothing.

It is not a secret that the key factor slowing the development of the Uzbek export potential is the absence of a sea access not only in Uzbekistan but in the neighboring states as well. Therefore, developing the transportation cluster will become one of the crucial points in the Turkish-Uzbek relationship. The results of Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visit to Turkey confirm it. During the visit, both presidents discussed what benefits would Uzbekistan have from launching the Baku-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway. And there is nothing accidental in both parties’ agreement to revise the transit fares for their optimization.

Uzbekistan wishes to attract the Turkish capital for launching joint ventures in the agricultural, textile, leather, and pharmaceutical industries. The Turkish investments are supposed to create new workplaces and improve the socio-economic situation, so the president will be able to carry out the announced reforms.

It is quite likely that the free economic zone Urgut opened in January 2017 in the Samarkand region will become the investment attraction center. Just think of the agreement on opening a direct flight connection between Istanbul and Samarkand and, also, simplifying the process of obtaining the Uzbek visa for certain categories of the Turkish citizens.

Undoubtedly, the direct flight connection agreement is not simply a symbolic one. Already at the first stage of its realization, it will widen the tourist industry possibilities and, to some extent, promote the shuttle trade which, from the practical standpoint, will increase the level of employment.

Completing the joint recreational-infrastructural projects in the Samarkand, Bukhara, Khwarezm, and Tashkent regions is supposed to have a positive effect on increasing the tourist flow to Uzbekistan. The agreement that the Turkish Demir Group company will build a tourist zone in Tashkent has already been reached. Obviously, this project will not be the only one.

It is too early to say that a tight political connection will soon be established between Turkey and Uzbekistan: the previous problems and their de-facto 12-year relationship freeze are still relevant. However, the security issues without which one cannot imagine any interstate relationships today will, undoubtedly, become one of the key elements of their development.

Up until recently, no less than 1.5 thousand Uzbek citizens have been living in the territory controlled by ISIS. Tashkent does not want Jihadists with the Syrian and Iranian military education returning to Uzbekistan. Therefore, the Turkish-Uzbek collaboration on fighting extremism, illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration, cross border organized crime is inevitable. At that, widening the bilateral cooperation on fighting terrorism and the other cross-national threats will have a positive effect on the security of the Central Asian region.

Also, it is quite feasible that Uzbekistan and Turkey will find a platform for cooperating on the Afghan issue. Turkey is trying to strengthen its presence, first of all, in the North of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan may actively assist it in this matter.

I believe that Turkey and Uzbekistan are really “destined” to be strategic partners, and their partnership will bring significant changes in the regional power balance. In the nearest years, Uzbekistan is expected to become the most speedily developing state whose potential today is not being realized even halfway.

Up until recently, Kazakhstan has been regarding itself as the regional leader with a qualitatively different, higher status in comparison with the other republics. From this standpoint, Kazakhstan has been trying to build its relationships with the key external players, be it the US, China, Turkey, Iran, certain EU countries. The same attempt has been made in regard to Russia. At least, the suggestion on the multi-level Eurasian integration was made openly and, today, the attempts to return to the topic are still viable.

From the Kazakhstan’s standpoint, “multi-levelness” is a state of affairs in which Kazakhstan, having become the regional leader, will be responsible for carrying out the dialogue with Russia, the EU, the US, China, and others as the leader of the Central Asian family. But such a family was never created which the conflict between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrates so clearly. Therefore, it is not simply a “trolling for fun” situation, its significance is so much greater.

Also, we should not forget that, over the period of 26 years, certain potential conflict points have been appearing in the Kazakh-Uzbek relationship. One does not like to talk about them, nonetheless, they exist.

They were first made public in 2005. In a series of the Kazakh analysts’ works, it has been directly pointed out that Uzbekistan, with its strengthening position and direct participating in the geopolitical combinations, will inevitably affect the internal and external development of Kazakhstan. In particular, the existence of the common border determines the inevitability of the mutual influence. Currently, this influence has a positive or neutral nature thanks to the wisdom of the leaders of both countries. However, one should not forget that the ethnic and cultural clashes between the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks have the deep historic roots.

The competition among the world power centers is automatically mirrored in the Kazakh-Uzbek relationship. Therefore, in all likelihood, the emerging breakthrough in the Turkish-Uzbek relationship will become an additional factor in Astana’s worries.

Nonetheless, let us remain optimistic and hopeful that the mutual apprehension and distrust between the two key Central Asian states will not develop any further and their mutually beneficial cooperation will surpass the period of their hidden rivalry.