Two crucial events worthy of our commentary took place in Kazakhstan last week. We are talking about Dariga Nazarbayeva’s giving up a deputy’s seat and the resignation of Kazakhstan’s Minister of Interior Erlan Turgumbayev.
The invasion of the Russian troops in Ukraine has completely outdazzled the tragic events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan. As a result, in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of the foreign diplomatic agencies, the press and the experts, the latter has turned into an event secondary to the new world crisis. On one hand, this unties the hands of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and his Administration in terms of their domestic operations. On the other hand, it automatically turns them into hostages - both of the Kremlin and of the collective West.
For, in the context of a direct conflict with their geopolitical opponents, Vladimir Putin and the Russian ruling elite (or its part) that supports him cannot afford to be soft and flexible. Which means that the ‘who is not with us is against us’ approach will now dominate the Russian domestic and foreign policy.
On the other hand, the attitude of the collective West towards Kazakhstan, its authoritarian political system and practices will now be determined not by what the Kazakh authorities say and do (or don’t do) but by the fact that Akorda and the Library can be used as a channel to exert pressure on the Kremlin (no matter softly or harshly - as luck would have it).
If the USA and the European Union together with the NATO block manage to turn Kazakhstan into the wall separating Russia and China, they will be super happy. And, if that happened, they would not be too concerned about Vladimir Putin getting ready to repeat the Ukrainian scenario in the north of Kazakhstan since, as cynical as it sounds, it would be happening on the homefront of their main geopolitical opponents and not near their own borders.
Given these extremely complex geopolitical realia, Akorda and the Library are desperate to retain the internal political stability, at least in its current form. Therefore, they will continue implementing their tactic that can be characterised as an attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of everyone -
- the protest-minded Kazakh citizens,
- those who were injured during the January events,
- the revenge-hungry siloviks,
- the officials not wanting the reforms and wishing to retain their status quo,
- the ruling elite unwilling to part with its wealth and spheres of influence,
- the socially-disadvantaged citizens demanding the immediate social benefits from the state and unwilling to listen to the excuses.
Our forecast has been confirmed by the two crucial events that took place last week. We are talking about Dariga Nazarbayeva’s withdrawal from a deputy mandate and the resignation of Kazakhstan’s Minister of Interior Erlan Turgumbayev.
Let us start with the second.
The official information regarding this personnel decision on the part of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev released on Akorda’s website is shockingly brief – ‘Turgumbayev Erlan Zamanbekovich has been released from the duties of the Minister of Interior of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the order of the Head of the State’. That is all.
Therefore, it is unclear if Turgumbayev has resigned voluntarily or the President has dismissed him on his own initiative. If the President has thanked him for his services or, on the country, has ordered to bring the retiree to justice.
In our opinion, it is neither a bureaucratic error nor laziness. It is political cautiousness on Akorda’s part. It looks like Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and his team have finally been forced to meet the demands of the public. But, even on paper, they have made sure that it would not arouse resentment of both parties - those who demand to hold the former Minister of Interior responsible for the January tragedy and the unlawful actions of his subordinates and those supporting their boss who was defending the peace and the order in the country by any means possible.
At the same, time Akorda has made a political gesture that clearly shows whose interests are more important to it today – the interests those who have been demanding Turgumbayev’s resignation or of his supporters. We are talking about his immediate appointment as the aide to the Kazakh Prime Minister.
Those who know the Kazakh practices and the rules of the game understand that, at the very least, the ex-Minister of Interior is not going to be held responsible, let alone criminally prosecuted. At least, for now.
As for Nursultan Nazarbayev’s daughter’s giving up a deputy’s seat, in our opinion, it was unavoidable and predetermined. However, due to the subjective factors, in other words, the unwillingness of Dariga Nazarbayeva to admit defeat, the performance has dragged on for as long as possible. Now it looks like she had got past it, accepted the situation and did what Akorda and the Library had been insisting on - left the political front-stage.
Now all the closest relatives of Nursultan Nazarbayev are flying below the radar of their fellows citizens and the Kazakh media. We have no doubt that they will all try to stay in the shadows for as long as possible (except perhaps Dariga Nazarbayeva).
The fact that the latter won’t let go is evident from her farewell statement, particularly, from her words that she is going to ‘focus on the public, humanitarian, cultural and charitable activities’ and ‘will continue to serve her country and its interests’ since ‘one does not need an office to do that’.
Let us repeat that these two key resignations clearly show that Akorda desperately wants to stabilise the internal political situation and, to achieve this, is prepared to make some non-crucial decisions such as withdrawing a deputy mandate or replacing the head of the Ministry of Interior.
At the same time, one needs to understand that the Kazakh authorities are seriously considering the possibility that the protest sentiments in the country may intensify again and take to the streets. And they are preparing for it in at least two ways.
The first one is the firming, strengthening and reforming of the enforcement block. The other personnel decisions of the President of Kazakhstan made last week, particularly the dismissal of Aset Isekeshev from the post of the Security Council’s Secretary and his replacement with Gizat Nurdauletov show that it is in the focus of Akorda’s attention.
The fact that Isekeshev has remained the aide to the head of the state indicates that they are not going to hold him responsible for the tragedy of January 2022. At the same time, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and his team, first of all, Secretary of State Erlan Karin have chosen to strengthen the Security Council as the main structure dealing with the issues of domestic political security via appointing Nurdauletov, a komitetchik and a professional silovik.
To see the crucial difference between him and his predecessor, one can compare their biographies. Then, it will all become clear.
It is hard to say when Akorda will feel ready to respond to the continuing protests not only with the verbal promises and the non-crucial decisions but with force. Probably after the Special Operations Forces of the Kazakh army will have been formed, trained and prepared for action. After the special units of the National Guard will have been revived and retrained. After the NSC will have been reformed and its special purpose ‘A’ unit will have been reinforced. But none of this is going to happen tomorrow.
As for the second way to pacify the protest-minded Kazakh citizens and the negative sentiment of the foreign public via partial concessions, according to our insiders, they are now considering some rather exotic options such as finding scapegoats.
They say that the role of one such scapegoat from among Secretary of State Erlan Karin’s entourage may be performed by ex-Minister of Interior Kalmukhanbet Kasymov who has made it into the Kazakh history under the notorious byname of ‘the Zhanaozen butcher’.
Of course, it does not necessarily mean he will be sacrificed, however, the very fact of such talks taking place speaks volumes. Among other things, of the possibility that ‘the leader of the nation’ himself may be sacrificed eventually.
